Introduction
Energy poverty is just one of the many afflictions suffered by developing nations in sub-Saharan Africa. Due to a lack of natural fueling materials such as natural gas and coal; many African nations are constantly searching for ways to improve their energy reserves. One of these nations has been quite successful in this pursuit. A decade ago, Ethiopia announced a hydroelectric project called the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) that is promoted to be the 7th largest dam in the world and even double Ethiopia’s energy capacity. Ethiopian leaders hope that this project will expand electricity access to the far reaches of their nation, as well as export some of that energy to their neighbors. The purpose of this essay is to explore whether or not the GERD has the capacity to provide widespread electricity access to its citizens and its neighbors. Specifically, this paper will explore the status of Ethiopia’s electricity grid, how much power Ethiopia could export to its neighbors, and issues that the dam brings to the regional geopolitical balance.
Analysis
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is a $4.2B project announced in 2011, situated on the Nile River that has been the source of major contention with Ethiopia’s neighbors Egypt and Sudan.[1] The dam has “an installed capacity of 5250 megawatts” and will create a reservoir “with a volume of more than 63 billion cubic meters.”[2] This amount of electricity production will be a massive addition to the total energy production in Africa, as Africa only produces around 4% of total global energy.[3] Additionally, the GERD will be beneficial in addressing sub-Saharan energy poverty, as in “rural areas of Malawi, Ethiopia, Niger, Chad and several other countries, less than 2% of the population have access to electricity.”[4]
The GERD also has climate benefits. Providing multiple thousands worth of hydroelectric MWe is an incredibly climate-friendly energy source for Ethiopia and its neighbors. Additionally, 88% of Ethiopians rely on biomass for electricity and cooking.[5] One issue with biomass reliance is deforestation, which leads to “to increased soil erosion and reduced soil nutrients; potentially leading to reduced agricultural yields, possibly setting up a cycle whereby more land needs to be cleared for agriculture.”[6] The GERD can help electrify areas that rely heavily on biomass, so that deforestation is limited. When looking at how the GERD can benefit Ethiopia, it is important to understand how the Ethiopian energy grid works, what problem it has, and how the GERD can fit into the grid.
Ethiopian Energy
When looking at the GERD it is important to understand the status of the Ethiopian electricity grid. An article written by Moges Tikuneh and Getachew Morku describes that the electricity grid is managed by the Ethiopian Electric Power company (EEPCo), which is “operated and owned by the government of Ethiopia.”[7] Currently, EEPCo has an electric grid that consists of power transmission lines that extend to all eight regions of Ethiopia and have varying HV levels ranging from 400kV to 132 kV.[8] This network extends to connect with the networks of both Djibouti and Sudan. This grid has a total generation capacity of “over 4300 MW and a peak load of 2164 MW.” [9] A research article about energy resource development in Ethiopia provides insight on EEPCos supply system. EEPCo currently has two energy power supply systems, “the Inter Connected System (ICS) and the Self Contained System (SCS).”[10] Most of the power supply is derived from hydropower, and diesel and geothermal power also add a few hundred MW to the entire gird.[11] This power supply is impressive; however, there are still issues with this electric system that include access, consistent supply, and pricing.
Despite the grid and annual power supply, many Ethiopians do not have access to electricity. It is estimated that only 46% of Ethiopians have access to electricity; and even that number is disputed as experts say that the estimates do not include those who cannot afford electricity bills.[12] Even those with access to electricity still rely on biomass, which accounts for 88% of energy used in the country.[13] In urban areas, “75.3% of the residents use electricity for lighting, while in rural areas kerosene 80.1% and firewood 18.5% are predominant.”[14] These numbers show that despite the presence of a large network of electricity, Ethiopia still has a long way to go in order to provide electricity access to all of its citizens.
When looking at supply issues, it is important to start at electricity losses in transmission. In the past decade, the Ethiopian power grid has suffered problems with transmission losses, losing 16-20% of its electricity production per year.[15] With the world average of transmission losses at ~13%, Ethiopia is not too far behind its national peers; however ,with the construction of a hydroelectric plant with a capacity of 6000MW, that number will only grow worse when trying to manage a large production of electricity that its grid cannot handle.
As mentioned previously, Ethiopia only provides electricity access to 46% of its citizens, of which the number is disputed as that estimate does not account for those who are able to access electricity but cannot afford the bills associated with electricity. This number is also heavily weighted by the rural population, as 93% of Ethiopians in urban areas have access to electricity; of which only 75% actually use electricity.[16] The Ethiopian government is currently working to fix this by making it cheaper to pay for electricity. As it stands in Ethiopia, the market cost for electricity after generation, transmission, and distribution costs is about $0.09 per kWh; however, current tariffs limit the price to $0.04-0.06 per kWh.[17] A problem associated with the tariffs is lower money supplies for the EEPCo, which leads to supply issues and blackouts. Ethiopia is choosing to address these issues by investing in “energy efficiency and energy-efficient technologies” in order to lower costs and ease the strain on its electric grid.
Despite all of these issues, the Ethiopian government has a positive outlook. The benefit of the GERD can provide Ethiopia with the power capacity to address energy access and power supply issues fairly securely. Ethiopia’s National Electrification Programme (NEP) was created to help address many of the issues with its electricity grid. The NEP hopes to have 100% electrification by 2025, through “on-grid and off-grid solutions” at a 65-35 split with both.[18] By 2030, the NEP hopes to extended on-grid connectivity to 96% as well as to increase generating capacity to 25,000MW.[19] If the NEP can accomplish their grid expansion goals, then the GERD can provide clean, consistent energy to thousands at a low price and with low risk.
Regional Energy
The GERD is not only a benefit for Ethiopia, but also for its neighbors. Ethiopia already has an established interest in exporting its energy production to its neighbors. Recently, the EEPCo secured a $13 million deal to export energy to Djibouti and Sudan.[20] This deal was simple enough to negotiate, as the EEPCo grid already connects to both of the nation’s importing Ethiopian electricity. The World Bank has also outlined how Ethiopia exporting hydroelectricity could benefit many of its neighbors such as: Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, autonomous Somaliland, Egypt, and Yemen.[21] At the cheap price of hydroelectricity, Ethiopia can export electricity for the market price of $0.09 kWh or even a bit higher, so that EEPCo can have a consistent money supply and Ethiopia can keep energy tariffs down for their citizens.
However, the issue with exporting electricity to regional neighbors is the problem of deciding how to divide electricity capacity for domestic use and exportation. According to a University of Nebraska report, with the GERD projected to be fully operational before the expansion of the EEPCo grid, Ethiopia will have a surplus of electricity.[22] This surplus will allow Ethiopia to export electricity to its neighbors without much concern about limiting electricity access to their own citizens. Additionally, once the grid is expanded and the power supply with it, Ethiopia should have plenty of energy to provide to its own citizens as well as to its neighbors.
Issues
In order to explore whether or not the GERD can be an effective energy solution for Ethiopia and the region surrounding, it is important to understand any geopolitical issues that surround it. While the GERD is a project that has benefits for regional cooperation, it is also an area of contention for nations downstream from the Nile. The largest area of contention is with Egypt and Sudan.
The Nile River is one of the most important water sources in the world, depended on as a primary water source for the nations of Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan. The Nile River “covers over 3.2 million cubic kilometers” and consists of “two separate rivers, the White Nile, originating in Lake Victoria, East Africa, and the Blue Nile originating in Lake Tana, Ethiopia.”[23] The Nile River Basin is located in twelve nations, and each of these nations uses a portion of the water provided by the Nile.
Many of the nations the Nile passes through are highly dependent on the river as a water source, exacerbated by the fact that these countries have large swathes of people without near water access. Egypt is one of the nations with a high dependence on the Nile, with 97% of its population living on the banks of the river, with that population living in an area that makes up only 8% of Egypt’s total size.[24] According to the Middle East Policy Council, the Nile River Delta is the source of 95% of Egypt’s water supply, making the Nile vital to the livelihood of its population.[25] Egypt’s agricultural industry is especially dependent on the Nile, as 86% of consumption of the Nile water supply is used for this purpose.[26] Any reduction of this supply would create a massive crisis in terms of food scarcity in Egypt. Both Sudan and South Sudan rely on the Nile in similar ways to Egypt; however, they do not share water access to the same degree as Egypt.[27]
On the other side of the Nile, Ethiopia is the location of the mouth of the Blue Nile, in which the “Ethiopian highlands provide nearly 86% of the Nile’s water,” producing the vast majority of water of the longest river in the world.[28] This is where the conflict starts. Ethiopia does not rely on the river water for consumption and use to the degree of the Egyptians, and thus the Ethiopian government wants to make use of the water that is freely flowing out of their borders. Thus Ethiopia founded the GERD. This project has angered the nations that use the water sourced from the Blue Nile and have escalated the risk for conflict.
It is important to understand who owns what rights to the Nile water, and what treaties have been signed involving this topic. There are three primary agreements that these nations signed regarding the rights to the Nile river water: the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929; the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters Agreement (FUNW) of 1956; and the Nile Basin Initiative of 1999 (NBI).[29] These agreements set the regulations for how the water is divided today and how much water is allotted to each nation.
First, the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929 was an agreement signed by Egypt and the United Kingdom, which was the governing authority of the following states: Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, and Sudan. The agreement was a simple one; it gave Egypt the right to veto any projects of the nations upriver that would affect the water supply coming into Egypt.[30] Additionally, Egypt was allocated 48 billion cubic meters of water and the region of Sudan was allocated 4 billion. This agreement held up for nearly thirty years until 1956, when Sudan became an independent nation. From then, conflict arose until the signing of FUNW in 1959.
The Full Utilization of the Nile Waters agreement of 1959 was an agreement signed between Egypt and Sudan which allocated a specific amount of Nile water to each participating nation. Egypt was allocated 55.5 billion cubic meters of water a year and 18.5 billion a year for Sudan.[31] Both parties were satisfied with the agreement; however, this agreement had a fatal flaw of ignoring the rest of the nations on the Nile (known as riparian states), including Ethiopia, a major producer of the Nile river water. Thus, in 1999, the riparian states, excluding Eritrea, signed the Nile Basin Initiative.
The Nile Basin Initiative of 1999 was an agreement between all of the Nile Basin nations that stated the group would “develop the river in a cooperative manner, share substantial socioeconomic benefits, and promote regional peace and security.”[32] While this agreement has been signed, the legal work and exact policy of the initiative known as the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) has yet to be ratified. In May, 2010, the CFA was prepared for signature by Basin countries; however, Ethiopia and Sudan suddenly backed out, citing a specific portion of the agreement:
“Nile Basin States therefore agree, in a spirit of cooperation: . . . (b) not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin State.” They then proposed an alternative wording for Article 14(b): “Nile Basin States therefore agree, in a spirit of cooperation: . . . (b) not to significantly affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin State,”[33]
Ethiopia and Sudan both objected to the specific line of “current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin State” as they believed that it would ratify the agreements of 1929 and 1959; both of which, especially Ethiopia, heavily objected to maintaining the codes of those agreements. One year later, Ethiopia committed to their protest of the framework agreement by beginning the process of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a project that severely angered the Egyptians and the Sudanese.
As it stands today, Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan are in contention over the project. If Ethiopia can prove that the dam does not reduce water flow and also if they strike a deal with Sudan and Egypt providing energy to the nations, then this issue can be averted from escalation.
Conclusion
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is a project that has great potential benefit to Ethiopia and its neighbors. However, while the dam has great potential for electricity output, the Ethiopian electric grid must improve to be able to take the massive electricity supply and distribute it to its citizens. Ethiopia’s outlook for this endeavor is promising, but the NEP must hit their goals in order to harness all of the energy produced by the GERD for Ethiopia’s citizens. However, while Ethiopia develops its electricity grid, the GERD does not need to be idle. Ethiopia can export its energy to regional partners, which is a great way for Ethiopia to help reduce the energy poverty in these nations and assist them to develop. While the GERD is a benefit, it is also a source of contention for Egypt and Sudan. However, with careful discussion and agreements, a compromise could be made to exchange water rights for energy. The GERD is one of the most important developing projects in the energy sector, and it is important that Ethiopia focuses on developing its electricity infrastructure in order for this marvel to benefit not only Ethiopia, but Africa.
Citations
1 Al Jazeera. (2022, February 21). Ethiopia’s massive Nile Dam explained. Explainer News | Al Jazeera. Retrieved December 5, 2022, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/8/explainer-ethiopias-massive-nile-dam
2 Chen, H., & Swain, A. (2014). Th Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Evaluating Its Sustainability Standard and Geopolitical Significance. Energy Development Frontier, 3(1), 11–19.
3 The Economist Newspaper. (2007, August 16). The Dark Continent. The Economist. Retrieved December 5, 2022, from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2007/08/16/the-dark-continent
4 Tesfa, B. C. (2013). Benefit of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP) for Sudan and Egypt. EIPSA Communicating Article, 1(1), 1–12.
5, 13-15 Gärtner, H. J., & Stamps, A. M. J. P. (2014). Ethiopian power grid: electrical power engineering & environment. Technische Universiteit Eindhoven.
6, 22 Taye, M. T., Tadesse, T., Senay, G. B., & Block, P. (2016). The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Source of cooperation or contention? Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 142(11). https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)wr.1943-5452.0000708
7-9 Moges Alemu Tikuneh, Getachew Biru Worku. Analysis of the Power Blackout in the Ethiopian Electric Power Grid. Science Journal of Circuits, Systems and Signal Processing. Vol. 8, No. 2, 2019, pp. 53-65. doi: 10.11648/j.cssp.20190802.143
10-12, 21 Asress, M. B., Simonovic, A., Komarov, D., & Stupar, S. (2013). Wind Energy Resource Development in Ethiopia as an alternative energy future beyond the dominant hydropower. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 23, 366–378. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2013.02.047
16-19 Contributor, G. (2021, December 15). Research: Electricity tariff rises in Ethiopia, how households Cope. ESI. Retrieved December 5, 2022, from https://www.esi-africa.com/industry-sectors/energy-efficiency/research-electricity-tariff-rises-in-ethiopia-how-households-cope/
20 Tekle, T.-A. (2022, October 11). Ethiopia earns $13m in power export to Sudan, Djibouti. The East African. Retrieved December 5, 2022, from https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/ethiopia-power-export-to-sudan-djibouti-3981224
23, 29 Gerald J. Krieger, “Water Wars of the Future: Myth or Reality?,” Parameters 52, no. 1 (2022): 89-104, doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3131.
24 Egypt’s population nears 100 million, squeezing resources, jobs. Aljazeera.com. (2020). Retrieved 17 April 2022, from https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/1/31/egypts-population-nears-100-million-squeezing-resources-jobs.
25-26 Schefer, S. (2022). Climate Change: The Nile River. MEPC.org. Retrieved 17 April 2022, from https://mepc.org/commentary/climate-change-nile-river.
27, 33 Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework; BR.-DC.-EG.-ER.-ET.-KY.-RW.-SU.-TA.-UG., May 14, 2010.
28 Ashok Swain (2011) Challenges for water sharing in the Nile basin: changing geo-politics and changing climate, Hydrological Sciences Journal, 56:4, 687-702, DOI: 10.1080/02626667.2011.577037
30-31 Kimenyi, M., & Mbaku, J. (2015). The limits of the new “Nile Agreement”. Brookings. Retrieved 17 April 2022, from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/04/28/the-limits-of-the-new-nile-agreement/. 32 FACTBOX: Nile river agreements and issues. Reuters.com. (2022). Retrieved 17 April 2022, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-nile-factbox-sb/factbox-nile-river-agreements-and-issues-idUSTRE56Q3MD20090727